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William S. Borden 
Mathematica Policy Research
Both the WIA reauthorization process and the planning efforts 
of the European Social Fund (ESF) would benefi t from a review of 
the recent experiences of performance management of employment 
training programs in the United States. This chapter presents an op-
erational perspective on how performance systems are designed and 
implemented. It also discusses the challenges to effective performance 
management—challenges that are little known except to the state and 
federal staff managing the performance systems, and that are often not 
clearly understood. There is very little that is easy and straightforward 
about measuring program performance. Seemingly simple concepts 
such as enrollment, exit, employment, earnings, and whom and when 
to count must be defi ned very precisely for performance results to have 
meaning. This chapter assumes that the reader is familiar with WIA and 
its performance measures. 
The design and implementation of effective performance manage-
ment involve many conceptual and operational issues. This analysis 
briefl y touches on many of them to illustrate how involved the process 
is and to alert program managers to the areas that they need to address. 
Each of these issues requires more extensive discussion than the scope 
of this chapter allows. Performance management raises interesting and 
signifi cant questions about organizational and human motivation, the 
dynamics of state-federal political power sharing, and the management 
of government programs. Policymakers tend to underestimate the chal-
lenges they face and sometimes lack the commitment necessary to make 
performance management processes as effective as they should be. The 
Employment and Training Administration (ETA) has corrected some of 
the problems that occurred early on, but there are still some operational 
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aspects that need improvement. The pursuit of effective and fair perfor-
mance management inevitably encounters challenges for which there 
are no easy solutions. 
Research on employment and training programs focuses primarily 
on evaluations of the impact of public investment in job training ser-
vices, but there are other factors to consider when analyzing the WIA 
performance management system; there is a clear dichotomy between 
its program management objectives and its evaluative objectives. This 
analysis argues that some form of performance tracking and data val-
idation is necessary for managing a complex national system of job 
training programs, even if the outcome data were not used to determine 
funding. Despite the great value of effective performance management, 
there are limits to using performance management data to drive funding 
decisions. 
It is also important to look beyond WIA and take a comprehen-
sive approach to assessing performance management of job training 
services by examining the programs that serve special populations. 
Policymakers need to consider how to provide effi cient and effective 
service to everyone, but especially people with disabilities, veterans, 
youth, and older workers, since the costs to serve them greatly exceed 
those of serving job seekers in general. This broader perspective also 
helps inform the debate about consolidating services under a universal 
program like WIA and provides the most useful information for the Eu-
ropean Commission as it looks at performance management and service 
delivery alternatives. Choices must be made about whether to manage 
services under a more unifi ed governance structure or as independent 
governance structures. In the United States, there is a somewhat confus-
ing mix of approaches, with WIA and the Employment Service (ES) at 
the core and considerable fragmentation and overlap beyond that. 
This analysis will draw broadly on lessons learned from imple-
menting performance measurement systems for WIA, the ES, the 
Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP), and the 
Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program at the Department of Educa-
tion, among others.1
We begin the chapter with a conceptual framework for analyzing 
performance management issues. This includes discussion of the goals 
of performance systems, the limitations on measuring government pro-
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gram performance, and how measures are designed and defi ned. These 
concepts form the building blocks for designing a performance system. 
The next section of the chapter then discusses the distinction be-
tween using informal processes to manage performance and effective 
performance management. It covers the importance of implementing 
rigorous standardization, validation, and monitoring processes for ef-
fective performance management, and looks at the ETA’s great progress 
in this area despite continuing problems. 
The following section examines the challenges and benefi ts of 
involving stakeholders in the design and implementation of the perfor-
mance measures. It analyzes the problems that occur when stakeholders 
are more concerned about meeting their goals than improving their re-
sults, as well as their somewhat exaggerated reaction to the burdens 
imposed by performance systems.
The fi nal section discusses key aspects of the WIA performance 
management experience to date, including how the measures have 
evolved and the use of wage records to measure outcomes. 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Performance Management versus Program Evaluation 
As Barnow and Smith (2004) point out, program evaluation and per-
formance management derive from different sources and motives and 
have deeply committed adherents.
 
This analysis takes the position that 
managing very large-scale and far-fl ung programs involving thousands 
of staff, millions of customers, and billions of dollars requires compre-
hensive management information systems. In other words, tracking and 
measuring customer fl ow, services, and outcomes is inherently desirable 
and even necessary to managing any modern organization. Therefore, 
the question is not whether we should track customer fl ow and services 
and measure performance, but whether and how we should use the data 
to determine funding, incentives, and sanctions. 
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Some in the evaluation community argue that there are risks in draw-
ing conclusions from administrative performance data; this concern is 
supported by a detailed understanding of data quality and measurement 
validity issues (Barnow and Smith 2004). The ETA’s experience in im-
plementing performance management systems over the 10 years since 
the passage of WIA has shown that it is diffi cult to measure perfor-
mance well, and that using inaccurate performance data to drive policy 
and incentives leads to misallocated resources. Putting more emphasis 
on using results to reward and sanction states than on ensuring that the 
results are valid and meaningful also leads to understandable yet often 
undesirable behavior by program operators. 
Performance management systems and research evaluation meth-
ods both have their strengths and weaknesses. Performance data are 
much more effi cient, systematic, comprehensive (they are produced for 
all customers), and timely, but they are somewhat crude and imprecise 
tools for measuring program impacts. Effective performance manage-
ment systems, however, are essential to good evaluation, particularly 
since performance management is the main reason that reliable data are 
available on programs. Some research efforts are abandoned because 
of incomplete and fl awed data sets, while other research projects draw 
erroneous conclusions because of bad administrative data. There is an 
increasing tendency to leverage the effi ciency of analyzing administra-
tive data versus more expensive experimental designs. In fact, both are 
needed. Even selecting stratifi ed samples of participants for random-
ization requires clean and complete participant data sets with accurate 
enrollment and exit dates and customer characteristics. 
Underlying Premises of Performance Management 
First, we need to defi ne precisely what the goals of a government 
program performance management system are and what constitutes a 
performance measure. We must also examine the motives and roles of 
the various actors in such politically and technically complex systems. 
Two premises underlie the increasing emphasis on accountability 
in government performance. The fi rst is that public funds must be spent 
wisely and produce a return on taxpayer investment. The second is that 
measuring the effectiveness of a business process is critical to manag-
ing a modern organization. 
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Behind the fi rst premise is the implicit assumption that govern-
ment agencies must be under pressure to perform just as in private 
enterprise—where profi t and loss determine success, rewards, and even 
survival. This underlying “Darwinian” notion that competition is good 
and that programs should demonstrate results to justify their existence 
is accepted by both major political parties. The Bush administration 
greatly advanced this approach to federal management and refl ected 
the program management approaches used in Texas and Florida, the 
most advanced states in using performance outcomes to drive funding 
decisions. 
But the notion that measuring the performance of a government 
program can substitute for the competitive pressures of the market-
place has many limitations. In the extreme, this idea takes the form 
of performance-based budgeting, where funding is directly correlated 
to performance, and programs can be totally defunded based on mea-
sured outcomes. In theory this makes sense, if there are valid measures 
and accurate performance data. The reality, however, is that measures 
frequently do not accurately refl ect underlying program performance, 
and even more often the data are inaccurate and inconsistent across 
operational entities. Accounting for all the factors affecting WIA per-
formance is impossible to do with great precision. We must control for 
variations both in the type of barriers to employment in the popula-
tion served and in the employment opportunities available in an area, 
and then we must implement rigorous data validation methods. Without 
such steps, cutting budgets or defunding programs or operational en-
tities based on program performance would be irrational and unfair. 
Such extreme approaches to using performance outcomes would also 
encourage program operators to engage in creaming: developing too-
easily-reached goals and underserving the target population by focusing 
on those most likely to be deemed a success, instead of serving those 
most in need of services yet less likely to succeed. 
Monopolies, Competition, and Privatization 
There is another fl aw in the application of the competitive ap-
proach: some programs enjoy natural monopolies. For example, one 
might conclude that if Ohio’s program was ineffective and Michigan’s 
was effective, people in Ohio should seek services from Michigan 
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or Michigan staff should replace Ohio staff. Obviously, the Darwin-
ian “perform or die” theory breaks down in this application. So, if we 
cannot put the Ohio program out of business, how do we act on our 
performance data? Do we provide increased funding to Michigan as a 
reward (presumably not needed), or do we cut Ohio’s funding as a pen-
alty (and probably damage their performance further)? We are left with 
the industrial quality control concept that we have used performance 
management to identify superior and unacceptable performance. Using 
the performance information, we can now intervene to provide techni-
cal assistance to Ohio and transplant best practices and methods from 
Michigan to Ohio. Finally, we must continue to track Ohio’s improve-
ment until its performance becomes acceptable. This is an appropriate 
application of performance management in a government setting. 
There are two situations in which the monopoly problem does 
not interfere with applying market forces to government performance 
management. First, programs that provide similar services to the same 
population can compete against each other. Since there are many over-
lapping job training programs, this is possible and indeed has been 
discussed by the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB), as we shall 
soon see. Every Bush administration budget since 2000 contained no 
funding for the National Farmworker Jobs Program (NFJP) and main-
tained that WIA should be the vehicle to provide these services.2 All the 
programs for special populations are mandatory One-Stop partners, but 
there is a wide diversity in the integration of these programs into the one-
stop setting. Most operators of programs for hard-to-serve populations 
believe that their clients would not be well served by WIA. This senti-
ment derives partly from the instinct for self-preservation and partly 
from the common belief among social workers that the population they 
serve is unique and cannot be well served by a more general program. 
It is true that a One-Stop operator might choose to prioritize services 
to customers that are more likely to gain employment unless counter-
balancing incentives are built into the system. The VR program, man-
aged by the Department of Education, operates very differently from 
the labor programs and has not adopted common employment measures 
or data validation activities. 
Second, services can be privatized and the public entity defunded. 
Some states have done this with large programs, and it is a common fea-
ture at the local level.3
 
So the ultimate application of market principles 
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is to privatize services and make all provider payments contingent on 
performance. This was used to some degree with performance-based 
contracting of training providers and is a feature of the Pathways to 
Work program in the United Kingdom. However, this approach puts 
tremendous pressure on the providers to manipulate their performance 
rates and puts unrealistic expectations on the ability of the oversight 
agency to act on high-quality data that fairly measure performance. If 
effective performance management methods are used, performance-
based budgeting would be an effective incentive in some settings. 
The second premise underlying performance management systems 
is that measuring the effectiveness of a business process (job training 
and placement services) is critical to managing a modern organization. 
Performance management techniques derive from industrial qual-
ity control techniques that measure the rate of defects in an industrial 
process (as popularized by W.E. Deming). The quality movement is 
based on the notion that processes that are measured work better than 
processes that are not measured (Blalock and Barnow 2001).
 
Perfor-
mance data are a vital tool for program managers at all levels to identify 
successful processes and methods, determine what works, share best 
practices, identify areas in need of improvement through technical as-
sistance, and forecast future customer fl ows and costs. It is common 
sense that program managers at all levels should have data on customer 
fl ow, services, and outcomes. The complexity and cost associated with 
collecting and analyzing high-quality program data, however, leads too 
many state and federal offi cials to avoid these challenges and instead 
put minimal effort into performance data. 
Both objectives of prudent public investment and improved service 
provisions have implications for understanding the potential limita-
tions of measuring the performance of government programs. We can 
place performance management objectives on a continuum ranging 
from tracking and performance data solely for better management to 
the other extreme of basing all funding decisions solely on performance 
outcomes. Finding the middle ground is appropriate. Although there are 
limits to how much a performance management system can tell decision 
makers about program costs and benefi ts, there are compelling reasons 
to track enrollments, services, and outcomes carefully. Doing so pro-
vides valuable information to managers at all levels of the system, from 
Congress and the OMB through the federal agency, and to the state 
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and the local area or grantee. In large, diverse systems like WIA and 
the other programs under discussion, the forces of fragmentation and 
inconsistent data are so great that only a very strong and standardized 
performance management system can overcome or at least neutralize 
them. We can thus see that it is more useful to think of performance data 
primarily as a management tool and secondarily as an evaluation tool. 
Defi ning a Performance Measure 
To serve the second premise—identifying relatively good or bad 
performance and measuring improved or decreased performance—a 
measure must produce a rate of success and not simply a count of ac-
tivities. Thus, a measure can be used to distinguish better and worse 
performance in meeting program objectives of a single operating entity 
(One-Stop, Workforce Investment Board [WIB], state, program) over 
time, and also compare performance between operating entities at all 
levels. Standards that identify minimally acceptable performance must 
be associated with measures. Failure to meet these standards would 
trigger remedial steps, such as technical assistance, and even punitive 
actions, such as sanctions. Standards for superior performance could 
trigger rewards such as incentives and documentation of best practices. 
A performance measure that does not produce a rate of success cannot 
accomplish these essential functions.4
Programs should set standards for minimum acceptable perfor-
mance by analyzing the range of outcomes across reporting entities 
(states, in the case of WIA). One simple axiom is that the minimum ac-
ceptable level is what 85 percent of states achieve; the theory being that 
if the bulk of states can achieve this performance, then it is a practical 
goal, and the trailing 15 percent should strive to improve. For example, 
the UI program sets performance goals based on the actual distribution 
of state performance rates. Another approach is to set different goals 
for different sets of customers based on their barriers to employment. 
Separate performance calculations should be produced anyway for sig-
nifi cant customer groups such as low literacy, people with disabilities, 
and those with poor work histories. As we will discuss later, however, 
absolute performance outcomes should be adjusted to account for dif-
ferences in customers and labor markets. This approach makes data 
validation even more essential as program operators have incentives 
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to exaggerate their customers’ barriers. The ETA has adopted a nego-
tiation approach to setting standards and has moved away from using 
national performance means and standardized adjustment mechanisms. 
Measuring Processes, Outputs, and Outcomes 
Another aspect of performance management is whether to mea-
sure processes or outcomes. Process measures are very indirect and are 
therefore usually unreliable for assessing actual performance. Process 
measurement operates on the assumption that adhering to good pro-
cesses will produce a better result, but execution of the process can be 
highly variable. Many of the process measurement approaches popular 
two decades ago have resulted in a checklist approach: items are checked 
off when manuals are written or staff are given various responsibilities. 
These continuous-improvement approaches are good means to an end, 
but they cannot substitute for measuring actual program results. 
Measuring intermediate outcomes, sometimes referred to as pro-
gram outputs, can be useful and can resemble process measures. For 
example, measuring program attendance, grade advancement, test 
scores, customer satisfaction, and the timeliness and quality of customer 
services provides prompt feedback to program managers and helps pre-
dict actual outcomes. These intermediate outcomes or program outputs 
should be secondary to actual program outcomes (such as long-term 
employment and earnings). 
Another school of thought focuses on societal rather than individ-
ual outcomes. This approach would use poverty levels and measures 
of community well-being to evaluate program effectiveness. This is a 
laudable objective and should be a component of an overall evaluation 
strategy, but it does not fi t well within the performance management 
paradigm. Performance management relies on reasonably direct feed-
back to program operators at all levels about the effectiveness of service 
delivery strategies on customer outcomes in order to improve manage-
ment decisions. Societal outcomes result in too broad a range of sources 
to provide direct feedback to management, but they should be taken 
into account when determining long-term policy direction. 
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The Impact of Performance Management on Customer Selection 
The general intent of the programs is to channel scarce funds to 
those who need services most because they have the most or the highest 
barriers to employment. Performance outcomes, however, are based on 
success, which is least likely for those with the highest barriers. How 
does the program operator respond to this dilemma? Clearly it would be 
rational to choose to serve the people most likely to succeed. This could 
be considered a socially useful impact of performance management 
on program behavior if the operator is selecting between two people 
to serve: one with barriers but whose success is feasible and one with 
more barriers whose success is unlikely. Society may benefi t more if the 
operator chooses to serve the person with the highest chance of success. 
In VR, for example, states are instructed not to serve people consid-
ered “too signifi cantly disabled” to become employed. If the choice is 
between someone with barriers where success is feasible and someone 
with relatively few barriers where the service would not be a signifi cant 
factor in employment, then society would not benefi t from the incentive 
to serve the least-needy customers. 
The correct means to rectify this potentially bad incentive is to 
adjust performance outcomes to provide more credit for achieving suc-
cess with a customer with higher barriers. This leads us back to the 
conundrum that measuring barriers can be subjective and unreliable. It 
also raises the question of how we perform the adjustment. Computing 
performance separately for different classes of customers based on bar-
riers provides the clearest information to program operators. Or we can 
adjust performance after the fact, based on regression models. Either 
approach, if done well, would produce the same results, though there 
are other adjustment factors to consider. 
Adjusting Performance Outcomes 
An effective performance management system must produce ob-
jective and systematic results. The system must account for the high 
degree of variability in both customers served and in labor markets. 
So the system must adjust performance results to provide credit for 
serving those with the most barriers and for variations in labor market 
conditions across geographic areas. Here some type of objective re-
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gression model is necessary. In 1998, the ETA decided to abandon the 
JTPA regression model, whose complexity had made it unpopular at 
both the state and the federal levels, in favor of a negotiation process. 
Negotiation provides fl exibility, but it does not allow for systematic and 
consistent performance goals across states. Instead, the outcome of the 
process is a function more of the toughness of the negotiator than of 
a method for developing consistent, reasonable performance goals. In 
addition, states could also try to manipulate the negotiation process by 
using various approaches to developing JTPA baseline data that would 
produce the lowest performance, thus ensuring that they could easily 
meet WIA improvement targets. The weakness of the negotiation ap-
proach was illustrated when the ETA chose to train regional staff on 
negotiation skills rather than on how to interpret state baseline perfor-
mance estimates so that initial WIA goals were set more accurately. 
EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND ITS COSTS 
Effective Performance Management Methods 
There is a signifi cant difference between collecting and calculating 
performance data using informal methods and using formal perfor-
mance management methods to ensure that performance results are 
meaningful and usable. Federal performance management processes 
should emulate management information systems approaches used to 
manage large business enterprises. The software development industry 
has developed formal methods to ensure that systems function prop-
erly from the original source of the data to the distribution of results 
to end users. Rarely are federal performance systems designed with 
understanding of the risks to data quality and the methods needed to 
overcome them. Each time a system is set up, the same long process of 
fi nding out what does not work takes place over several years before 
usable performance data are obtained. Sixteen years after the passage of 
the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA), the technical state 
of federal performance management is still dismal. 
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The contrast between ineffective and effective performance man-
agement can best be illustrated by SCSEP. Attempts to draw samples 
for customer satisfaction surveys for SCSEP failed because there were 
few usable case management data on who the customers were. This and 
other defi ciencies in the performance reporting system led the SCSEP 
program to develop a sophisticated national case management system. 
The SCSEP system contains real-time data on all customers, services, 
and outcomes, and has robust analytical and reporting functions. The 
availability of these detailed, individual-level performance manage-
ment data enabled the SCSEP program to smoothly transfer 12,000 
participants (as a result of the national grantee competition of 2006), to 
develop timely and comprehensive management reports for all levels of 
the system, and to report on participants funded by the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act in real time with virtually no additional 
effort. Prior to this investment, most SCSEP performance data reports 
were aggregated essentially by hand at local offi ces and then reaggre-
gated at the state level before being submitted to the ETA. There was no 
audit trail and thus no way to determine or support the reliability of the 
data. Through the use of thorough and effective performance manage-
ment methods, SCSEP has gone from having few reliable performance 
data at all to having among the best data of all federal programs. 
However, this drastic progress in SCSEP (and to a lesser extent in 
other ETA programs using less extensive methods) has come with sig-
nifi cant expense at the federal level. Federal managers at all levels fi nd 
it diffi cult to justify the costs of high-quality data systems for several 
reasons. First, they view performance management narrowly as a re-
porting function and not a performance enhancement process. Second, 
they tend to focus only on the costs to the federal agency budget rather 
than the overall cost of the program to the taxpayers. This is a fund-
ing allocation issue that Congress should address. Finally, it is hard 
to convey the complex technical risks and complexities of collecting 
data from such a large and highly fragmented system, where there are 
incentives to interpret data rules in such a way as to optimize program 
performance outcomes. Investments in standardized data processing 
technology are the only means to develop high-quality data sets and 
result in considerable cost savings overall. 
Performance management is a much simpler and more effi cient 
process for federally run programs than for state-run programs because 
The Challenges of Measuring Performance   189
there are fewer operational entities. Therefore, there are considerable 
costs involved in allowing states to administer their own programs—
even make their own rules in some cases (such as UI, Medicaid, and 
SNAP)—and in trying to achieve usable national data. It is possible to 
map or translate state variations to a federal data template to make the 
data more consistent, but this requires signifi cant effort and expense. 
Given the high turnover in state staff, getting all states to understand 
and operate using consistent data rules is a never-ending task. This task 
would seem to be even more challenging for Europe. 
The large number of Congressional committees that have control 
of sources of employment program funding cause the overall system 
to be highly fragmented, with considerable overlapping services and 
more costly reporting processes. The One-Stop system is intended to 
be seamless to the customer but certainly not to the program managers, 
accountants, or performance and reporting staff. The fragmented fund-
ing streams result in higher implementation costs because One-Stops 
have to collect data to report to many programs and agencies with vary-
ing and even confl icting defi nitions of customer characteristics (such as 
multiple defi nitions of veteran). Thus it is necessary to step back and 
look at the whole range of programs serving the population needing 
employment supports while acknowledging that specialized programs 
may be more effective in serving diffi cult populations. 
Having consistent and reliable data across all states and local work-
force areas is essential to using the data to manage programs. Without 
reliable and consistent data, the entire performance process is at best a 
waste of effort and at worst a source of bad policy (rewarding inferior 
and punishing superior performance). Most program operators at the 
state and local levels are diligent and honest, but there are some who see 
performance as a game, not a management tool, and fi nd clever ways to 
manipulate their performance outcomes. The most fundamental chal-
lenges to obtaining reliable and consistent performance data are lack of 
precision and clarity in data requirements and lack of standardized and 
sophisticated data processing and calculation tools. 
Defi ning Data Elements 
The risks to reliable and consistent data are twofold: 1) casework-
ers will interpret and thus enter information into the case management 
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systems very differently, and 2) the data will be processed very differ-
ently by software developed separately by every state or grantee. Some 
of the WIA measures were ill defi ned early on, but in 2001 ETA did 
launch an ambitious data validation effort that has resulted in data that 
are considerably more reliable. 
The fi rst step in obtaining reliable data is to write clear, objective 
defi nitions and to defi ne precise source documentation to verify the va-
lidity of a data element. This is much more diffi cult than one would 
think. When asked to validate data, we have responded by asking poli-
cymakers for the criteria to use to distinguish valid from invalid data 
and what source documentation we can use to make the determination. 
Policymakers are often stumped by these very diffi cult questions. Mea-
sures and their component data elements should not be used if they 
cannot be defi ned and validated. 
There were some defi nitional problems in the original WIA youth 
measures for credential and skill attainment. The skill attainment mea-
sure was intended to give credit for youth that advanced in a skill area 
over a one-year period. The fi rst operational step was to limit the num-
ber of possible skills attained to a maximum of three per youth per 
year. This put a cap on local areas setting large numbers of easily at-
tained goals for a single customer. The next step was to defi ne a skill 
attainment. Some felt that this was too diffi cult because of the wide 
variation in capabilities of the youth being served. An easy skill for one 
youth might be a huge challenge for another. This is obviously true, 
so ETA decided to provide fl exible parameters for what constituted a 
skill attainment. Case managers used this fl exibility to decide subjec-
tively, on a case-by-case basis, what constituted a skill attainment and, 
in so doing, created inconsistent defi nitions of skill attainments across 
states and WIBs. Thus, from the fi rst day it was diffi cult to compare 
the skill attainment results across reporting entities. Considerable effort 
was made to program the calculations, to train the states and local ar-
eas, and to collect all the required data and discuss what it all meant. In 
fact, such vaguely specifi ed measures end up costing more than clearly 
defi ned ones, because there is never any closure to the discussions on 
how to calculate the measures and what to make of the results. This is 
an example of how effort and resources can be wasted if performance 
measures are vaguely defi ned or performance data are inconsistent and 
unreliable. 
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The credential attainment measure met a similar fate. The fi rst prob-
lem was that some decision makers believed they needed to show strong 
results early in the implementation of WIA in order to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the program. This view led to a loose defi nition of cre-
dentials, which encouraged states to defi ne them so as to ensure that 
most customers would attain them. One state manager said it was “like 
a license to print our own money.” Needless to say, the measure pro-
duced unreliable data. 
Fortunately, the advent of common-measures discussions by the 
OMB in 2003 allowed ETA to correct these defi nitional problems. Partly 
based upon the lessons of the skill attainment and credential rates, 
the OMB and the ETA decided to develop new measures that would 
overcome some of the defi ciencies of the original ones. They defi ned 
credential more strictly by eliminating work readiness credentials and 
focusing more on credentials and certifi cates that reward improvement 
in occupational skills. They also merged the credential rate with the 
diploma rate, which led to the new attainment of a degree or certifi cate 
rate. In addition, they replaced the skill attainment rate with a literacy 
and numeracy gains measure that required that states use U.S. Depart-
ment of Education–approved standardized tests to determine whether 
or not an individual youth had improved his/her skills. This change cre-
ated a well-defi ned measure but presented a complex challenge to write 
detailed specifi cations for calculating the measure accurately, given 
the almost infi nite number of possible sequences of test scores and ex-
ceptions. Once the programming was done, testing the accuracy of the 
calculations consumed hundreds of hours of staff time. 
Manipulating Performance 
Performance outcomes can be manipulated during the enrollment 
and exit processes. A casual observer would not see how diffi cult it is to 
defi ne enrollment date and exit date, which drive all performance calcu-
lations. Some states’ fi rst reaction to the launch of WIA was to impose 
more restrictive criteria on enrollment. They did not want to be held 
accountable for outcomes for customers who received very inexpensive 
services. The lower enrollment did not refl ect the number of people 
being served, just the number for which the state was accountable in 
the performance system. This was done by redefi ning “staff-assisted 
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services.” Because WIA and ES are universal-access programs with 
a broad range of services, from self-service only (e.g., using the job-
seeking aids on Web sites or at One-Stops without assistance) to 
staff-assisted training, there was signifi cant discussion early on about 
at what point in the continuum of services a customer should be for-
mally included in the performance system. The ETA instructed states 
to include customers when they received signifi cant staff-assisted 
services. Some states, however, defi ned staff-assisted services very 
broadly, while others defi ned them very narrowly. Enrollment numbers 
fell sharply in some areas. It is not clear whether particular types of 
customers (such as incumbent workers, where earnings gains would be 
most diffi cult to achieve) were more likely to be left out of the report-
ing system or not. Measuring performance outcomes for customers who 
received little or no staff-assisted service and may have never visited a 
One-Stop is problematic. On the other hand, there has been very sig-
nifi cant public investment in self-service facilities, so it is appropriate 
to determine whether the investment has led to better outcomes. Self-
service utilization measures might be good complements to outcome 
measures for this customer group. 
Another, more direct way of distorting outcomes was to manipulate 
exit dates. One dilemma states faced when they converted from JTPA 
to WIA was what to do with hundreds of thousands of JTPA customers 
who had never exited from JTPA but were no longer receiving services. 
The records of these customers had gone to the “data graveyard,” 
never to be included in performance outcomes. States were instructed 
to purge these unmeasured customers from the system to allow WIA to 
start with a clean slate, and the concept of “soft exit” was developed to 
prevent a reoccurrence of the problem. States were instructed to gener-
ate an exit date for any customer who had not received a service for 90 
days. There was much discussion about whether the exit date would 
be the last date of service or 90 days later, and also about how to avoid 
exiting customers in long-term training programs. The obvious means 
of manipulating performance is to avoid exiting customers until they 
have been placed in jobs. It is impossible to enforce rigorous standards 
or consistency across states for these issues because there is no way to 
tell from the case management fi les whether there were real continuing 
services provided or if the customer was being “held” in the system 
until job placement. 
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Defi ning Employment and Earnings 
Defi ning employment and retention and earnings is not straight-
forward. Traditionally programs using manual follow-up methods have 
used fairly rigorous defi nitions. For example, SCSEP required exited 
customers to be employed for 60 of the fi rst 90 days after exit to be 
counted as placed. Other programs set minimum levels of hours per 
week to exclude very partial employment or looked at average hourly 
wage and even whether the employment was related to the training pro-
vided. The universal use of wage record data under WIA raised a new 
set of issues. Wage records were quite thorough (all wages reported 
from multiple employers could be easily captured and aggregated) but 
did not provide details on employment and only reported quarterly to-
tals. The number of hours worked, the hourly wage, and the occupation 
were generally not available, and it was not known if someone worked 
one day in the quarter or 90 days. Therefore, it was decided that the total 
earnings in the quarter after exit would defi ne “entered employment.” 
The threshold for total dollars required was discussed, and fi nally the 
ETA determined that any amount would qualify, making a very low 
barrier for placement. 
The wage record system does not operate to serve employment pro-
gram research or performance assessment, but to determine employer 
UI tax rates. It would be useful but diffi cult to obtain more detail on 
employment from employers, but given the high degree of automation 
of payroll systems, especially for larger employers, it may be feasible 
at some point in the future. 
The earnings gain measure raised a host of additional defi nitional 
and technical problems. States had considerable concern about how 
enrolling laid-off, high-wage manufacturing sector workers would pro-
duce sharp earnings decreases after services when they were placed 
in lower-paying service industries. Some initial analyses of dislocated 
worker earnings replacement rates, however, showed earnings gains of 
over 300 percent.These spectacular results derived from customers who 
had already received services for a year or more prior to enrollment 
in WIA and thus had zero preprogram earnings. Defi ning the dates to 
use to calculate preprogram earnings, determining the actual disloca-
tion date, and then collecting the correct quarters of wage record data 
proved to be very problematic. States approached these issues in vari-
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ous ways and with various levels of success, leading to inconsistent 
results. 
A related issue involved measuring earnings gains from the fi rst 
quarter after exit to the third quarter after exit. This did not seem to 
be a meaningful measure because it only measured earnings increases 
over a very short period when raises would not likely be provided. This 
measure was supported by the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) program, where there were by defi nition no pre program earn-
ings. Ultimately the ETA abandoned pre- and postprogram earnings 
measures and now reports only average postprogram earnings. 
The lessons from the early implementation of WIA are clear: do not 
attempt to measure something you cannot defi ne or validate, and make 
sure the calculations are reliable and well tested. 
Reporting and Validating Performance Data 
The ETA has been in the forefront of federal performance manage-
ment and data validation efforts since the 1970s for two reasons. First, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1969 that the USDOL had to ensure 
that UI claimants received payments on time, and this required mea-
suring the timeliness of UI activities. Second, it was discovered that 
the allocation of administrative funds to state UI agencies was inequi-
table because of inconsistencies in how states counted their activities. 
UI conducted a signifi cant upgrade to its performance management and 
data validation systems in the 1990s and set the model for the rest of the 
federal government to follow, which generated a healthy culture of data 
quality and standardization in the state workforce agencies. 
With the passage of WIA, the ETA sought to bring standardized 
reporting and data validation to the workforce programs, and such sys-
tems were gradually put in place starting in 2002. The data validation 
process asks whether the data used to calculate performance are correct 
and whether the performance measures were calculated correctly. This 
process led to much more rigorous defi nitions of data elements, as well 
as the development of standardized reporting software that states could 
use to edit fi les, perform reporting and performance calculations, and 
receive immediate feedback on data problems and performance. It also 
served to enhance the quality of program data and greatly speed the 
availability of performance data to the ETA, the OMB, Congress, and 
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the research community. In addition, the reporting and data validation 
software provided basic analytical functionality so that states could ex-
plain in detail the changes in performance over time. Some states made 
extensive use of the analytical capabilities of the software to educate 
their local areas about how the measures worked. 
Performance calculations are highly complex, and extensive testing 
is required to ensure their accuracy.5 Before the use of standardized data 
calculations at a federal level, each state calculated its own performance 
at considerable expense and with inconsistent methods and results. Ini-
tially, the ETA was committed to the standardized reporting and data 
validation methods and processes, especially in light of USDOL Of-
fi ce of Inspector General (OIG) reports on defi ciencies in ETA data 
(see OIG 2001a,b; 2002a,b; 2003; 2005).
 
The standardized software 
required continued investment to maintain because of the large number 
of changes in the performance measures and because the software had 
to be enhanced to meet growing state analytical and diagnostic needs. 
States embraced the concept of accurate and consistent performance 
calculations and data edits and liked the immediate feedback they re-
ceived on their data quality and performance.6
 
Further, the total cost of 
using standardized software was far less overall than the cost of having 
each state program its own calculations, not to mention that the sepa-
rately calculated performance data would be unreliable.7
 
In addition to editing fi les, calculating performance, and provid-
ing basic analytical functionality for states, the data validation software 
samples customer records for validation of data elements. In the valida-
tion process, state monitoring staff review a small sample of records 
against supporting documentation maintained at the local area. The 
software contains sampling algorithms that make the state monitoring 
process as effi cient as possible for creating estimates of errors for each 
data element by state. State staff generally found the data validation 
process to be very helpful and effi cient for monitoring data quality at 
the local level. Unfortunately, the software does not yet compute the 
standard error rate for each data element, so the ETA cannot set or en-
force data accuracy standards.8
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Federal Performance Monitoring 
The ETA’s regional offi ces have always monitored state programs. 
There are two basic forms of monitoring: 1) process monitoring con-
sists of reviews of required state functions to ensure that they meet 
federal standards, and 2) data monitoring involves reviewing samples 
of records against source documentation and is thus identical to the 
data validation effort conducted by states. In 2006, the ETA designed 
a process by which federal regional monitoring staff would review 
a subsample of the records reviewed by the state staff to ensure that 
states were applying the data validation rules consistently. The federal 
staff would enter their results for the subsample into the data valida-
tion software, which would then generate a report to ETA on the state’s 
accuracy. This monitoring process has not yet been implemented. The 
recent OIG report (2009) concluded that “without an effective monitor-
ing process, ETA has no assurance that data validation is operating as 
designed so that the data can be relied upon for accurately reporting 
performance results” (p. 11).
Some ETA regional offi ce staff developed their own data-
monitoring processes, but they are implemented inconsistently, and not 
all regions monitor data systematically. Therefore, there is no systematic 
check on whether the states are performing the data element validation 
consistently and correctly. With no data accuracy standards, no precise 
calculations of state error rates, and no check that states are perform-
ing the validation correctly, the reliability of WIA data is still not clear. 
This is unfortunate because states still incur the full burden to perform 
annual data validation. This annual validation exercise does allow state 
staff to conduct effective data monitoring of local areas and thus facili-
tates the detection of data problems and discussion of remedies. 
THE CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS OF
STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT 
The process of designing performance measures starts with the 
funding legislation. Congress requires that recipients of funding sub-
mit certain performance outcomes to justify continued funding. Statutes 
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also normally contain some language about remedial or punitive steps 
that will be taken if programs fall short of performance goals. Of course, 
Congress does not operate in a vacuum, and the legislation refl ects in-
put from the executive branch (the OMB and agencies) as well as from 
lobbyists for the state agencies and population-specifi c interest groups.9
 
Statutory language about measures is usually very general, so agen-
cies must add further levels of detail to “operationalize” the measures, 
including the specifi c data elements that must be reported and how the 
measures are to be calculated. Effective performance measurement re-
quires strong leadership from the federal government both in defi ning 
the measures and objectives and in providing the defi nitional structure 
and necessary performance management tools. In some programs with 
immature performance management processes, program operators are 
given the latitude to defi ne or choose their own measures. This approach 
may be politically popular, but it rarely produces any usable results and 
does not lead to program improvement. States and grantees look to the 
federal partner for leadership and structure but still want input on the 
operational details.   
Soliciting Feedback and Consulting Program Operators 
Both aspects of the dual rationale for measuring performance—ac-
countability and program improvement—make it desirable that program 
operators “buy in” to the system. Obviously, the program management 
and program improvement rationale for measuring performance is ad-
vanced when program operators fi nd the results meaningful and helpful. 
Even the program accountability rationale works best when operators 
fi nd the measures to be legitimate. Therefore, the programs discussed in 
this chapter have sought extensive consultation from program operators 
(states, local areas, and grantees) during the design process and during 
the phase of the process when the measures are being operationalized. 
At the end of 1998, the ETA produced an initial draft of the ap-
proach to measuring WIA, but it did not contain clear and well-defi ned 
measures, and thus was not well received by the states. Therefore, dur-
ing the spring of 1999 there ensued a series of consultative meetings 
attended by federal and state staff. Six early adaptor states launched 
WIA on July 1, 1999, and representatives of these states met with fed-
eral staff over a series of months to hammer out the details. The fi rst 
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complete set of technical performance specifi cations was published in 
March 2000, before the other states implemented WIA on July 1, 2000. 
Input from state staff was very helpful in operationalizing the measures 
because of their rich knowledge of program operations and workforce 
data. Feedback on the technical aspects of the measures continued to 
be received during conferences and meetings for the next two years. 
Other programs had similar if less extensive consultations. All the ETA 
programs relating to WIA established performance workgroups to seek 
input from state and grantee staff.10
 
Fear of Performance Management 
The performance measures were seen by some states, local areas, 
and grantees primarily as a threat rather than as a management tool. 
This perception greatly infl uenced their input on how the measures 
should be designed. It is logical that those at risk of sanctions from mea-
sured poor performance would become defensive and try to reduce the 
effectiveness of the measurement system itself. This defensive impulse 
leads to actions to evade the implications of the measures and to resist 
measurement in a number of ways. As mentioned in the data validation 
discussion above, state WIA staff play a dual role in the performance 
system and are sometimes defensive because they are being measured 
as states and sometimes supportive of effective performance methods 
because they oversee local areas. 
The essence of the resistance to effective federal performance meth-
ods was documented in a Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO) 
report (2005) on WIA, which said that “collecting uniform performance 
data at the national level [and] giving states and localities the fl exibility 
they need to implement programs” are “competing objectives” (p. 1). 
This is based on a misunderstanding actively pushed by people who 
resist performance processes to muddy the true role of performance 
management techniques in improving government services. 
We must distinguish clearly between service delivery and program 
management. Performance management systems track common events 
such as enrollment date, customer characteristics, limited service dates, 
exit date, and outcomes. Performance management systems do not 
specify how services are delivered. Therefore, there is no inherent con-
fl ict between allowing program operators creativity and fl exibility in 
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customer outreach and providing services and tracking customer char-
acteristics and fl ow through the system and measuring outcomes. Local 
program operators and grantees are fond of saying that they can either 
serve people or enter case management data, but they cannot do both. 
This is all too often a defensive reaction to fear of being measured and 
a refl ection of inadequate management capacity. That is why it is so 
important to focus initially on building strong data capacity through ef-
fective performance management tools and methods rather than on the 
punitive aspects of performance management. 
The Relative Burden of Federal Performance Requirements 
Despite the complaints about the burden of federal data require-
ments, many states collect far more detailed performance data and 
invest in more sophisticated performance management systems than 
anything imposed by the ETA. There is wide variation among states, 
grantees, and local program operators in their level of sophistication 
and the level of case management data they collect. The goal of the fed-
eral performance management system, including the key data validation 
component, should be to raise every state and grantee to a minimum 
acceptable level of data management and data reliability. There will 
always be states with more sophisticated performance systems than are 
practical for the federal partner to develop. 
Tracking participants, services, and outcomes is essential to any 
effective program management at all levels of the system and would be 
done for the most part in the absence of any federal performance and 
data validation initiatives. From having overseen the development of 
the Paperwork Reduction Act requests for performance and data val-
idation for many years, it has become clear that little information is 
collected solely for performance purposes, and that none of it constrains 
program operators from employing innovative and diverse service de-
livery methods. 
Once we accept that program operators must know whom they are 
serving and what services they are providing, the only aspect of perfor-
mance management that is a true burden is collecting outcome data. It 
is less important to the basic management of the program to track ex-
tended outcomes as required by WIA retention rates than to track 
customers and services. But if those long-term outcome data can be 
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collected effi ciently through wage records or some other form of al-
ready existing high-quality administrative data, then measuring even 
long-term outcomes becomes very cost-effective. There is also a strong 
argument to be made that long-term follow-up services are an expensive 
but essential part of an effective service delivery strategy, especially for 
the hardest-to-serve populations. The WIA Youth program and SCSEP 
both require long-term follow-up to support customers after exit, but 
this is resisted in the VR program even though the need for long-term 
support is evident in that population. 
Another source of resistance to performance management is the 
concern that the population served is too varied and complex to permit 
effective measurement of the actual performance of a program operator. 
This becomes a problem when the emphasis is on incentives and sanc-
tions and not program management, because program operators do not 
trust that the measures are fair. This notion is reinforced by the “social 
worker” mindset that is especially pervasive in programs serving spe-
cial hard-to-serve populations. Many staff in these programs assert that 
all programs must be run well and must be effective because program 
staff are sympathetic to the population being served. There are thus 
three complementary threads to the resistance to effective performance 
management: 1) collecting data is a burden, 2) performance measures 
cannot accurately refl ect the quality of services rendered, and 3) staff 
are well intentioned and therefore must be left alone to perform their 
work. 
To be fair, local program operators and grantees often operate under 
stressful conditions. They serve very diffi cult populations with inad-
equate and declining funding levels and operate under the weight of 
threatening and somewhat crude performance measures. It is therefore 
critical that the performance system be sold primarily as a means to 
achieving better management and analysis capacity. 
There is one critical area of performance management in which 
program operators are forced to bear a true burden for which no relief is 
likely to be found. That burden comes with requirements to collect data 
validation documentation from the most diffi cult-to-serve populations, 
such as homeless youth, people with disabilities, very low-income older 
workers, and non-English-speaking customers. Collecting such docu-
mentation is important to program integrity, not only because these are 
important program eligibility criteria, but also because programs are 
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given extra credit for serving these people. SCSEP measures, for ex-
ample, give credit to the grantees for specifi c categories of customers 
(disabled, homeless, low literacy skills, and frail), and in the VR pro-
gram the category of “severely disabled” is critical to program intake 
and performance outcomes. In addition, programs allow performance 
outcome exemptions for medical conditions and even for medical con-
ditions of family members; this is a major issue for the integrity of 
performance outcome data for SCSEP, which serves many people over 
age 70. It is very convenient to avoid a negative performance outcome 
by classifying the customer as excluded from performance. 
Collecting documentation to show that customers meet criteria for 
extensive barriers to employment or exclusion from performance rep-
resents a true burden for case managers. Medical conditions, disability, 
homelessness, homeless youth, and family income are all very diffi cult 
areas to document. For example, how do you prove you are homeless? 
The only approach that we have found is to allow—in lieu of actual 
evidence—“self-attestation” in the form of documents the customers 
sign testifying as to their conditions. This will continue to be a chal-
lenge to effective performance management for the foreseeable future. 
Measuring Accountability 
Once we get past the “data are a burden” argument, we fi nd a more 
subtle and valid tension between simplicity and clarity in measures and 
determining the program’s actual accountability for outcomes. With a 
defensive mentality, program operators view performance measures as 
directly measuring their accountability or their effort in serving each 
individual customer. In fact, it is impossible to design measures that can 
account for all the factors bearing on success with a single customer. 
Performance management is a statistical process that assumes that mea-
sures of a suffi cient number of outcomes can distinguish between more 
successful and less successful processes and methods. 
Not understanding how performance management works, program 
operators seek direct measures of their accountability and thus want the 
measures to be designed to account for every exception. One state staff 
person argued that their state should not be held accountable when a 
customer failed to show up for services and had a negative outcome. I 
responded with two questions: 1) Why would more people fail to show 
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up for services in your state than in other states? 2) If customers did 
tend to show up less in your state than in other states, was that not a 
valid fi nding about the quality of your services? Performance goals are 
always set well below 100 percent so that the system accounts for such 
“failures” that cannot be directly attributable to a program operator’s 
defi ciencies. 
The impulse to design measures that account for individual cus-
tomer circumstances leads to exponential increases in complexity. Each 
additional factor that a measure must consider to defi ne success, such 
as excluding outcomes where customers became ill, doubles the num-
ber of possible outcomes. Some accountability factors are signifi cant 
enough to incorporate into the measure design, and more sophisticated 
measures are practical if standard automated tools are used to perform 
data analysis and calculate measures. But ironically, once program op-
erators have succeeded in adding factors to better measure what they 
are directly accountable for, they often complain that the measures 
have become too complex to understand or to explain to their local 
stakeholders. So, there is a tricky balance between designing detailed 
measures of actual accountability and designing measures that are easy 
to understand and explain. 
THE WIA PERFORMANCE SYSTEM 
The Evolution of WIA Measures 
Stakeholder concerns had a direct and signifi cant impact on the 
early WIA measures, where there was signifi cant input from states and 
local areas. The initial WIA measures were very simple, but within a 
year they had become much more complex. One example of a change 
that added complexity but greatly strengthened the measure was in the 
treatment of youth who were placed in postsecondary education but not 
in employment. Originally, since it was considered that the Department 
of Labor could not reward an educational placement, the postsecondary 
education placement without employment was classifi ed as a nega-
tive outcome. In other words, placing a youth in Harvard was bad, but 
placing him at McDonald’s was good. After further discussion it was 
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decided that postsecondary placement without employment would be-
come a “neutral outcome,” where the record was excluded from the 
placement calculation completely. 
In 2003, the OMB launched a common-measures initiative for 
federal employment programs to try to standardize performance calcu-
lations across the many federal job training programs. This effort was 
prompted by the breakdown of the competitive approach to program 
funding. The Bush administration sought to use program outcome data 
to determine which programs were effective and which were ineffective 
and should be defunded or folded into more effective programs. This 
attempt was confounded by the lack of comparability of performance 
data across the data sets. For example, SCSEP defi ned a successful 
placement as 30 days of continuous employment within the fi rst 90 days 
after exit, while WIA defi ned it as any earnings at all in the quarter after 
exit. The disparate defi nitions of success and performance goals across 
programs made it an even greater challenge to control for differences in 
the populations served. 
The ETA embraced the OMB initiative and launched a second 
round of state-federal discussions over how to implement the new com-
mon measures. Other programs within ETA, including VR and even 
SCSEP, resisted the common measures, arguing that their populations 
were special and that they could not be expected to achieve results 
comparable to those of the mainstream programs. SCSEP has since 
adopted the common measures, but VR has still not implemented them. 
The common measures are a good step toward effective performance 
management at the national level across training programs and do not 
constrain programs from using other performance management tools. 
The Use of Wage Records 
In the absence of a good source of data on postprogram earnings 
like the UI wage record system, it would be very diffi cult to develop 
an effi cient and effective performance management system, especially 
for such large-scale programs as WIA and ES. UI wage records are 
reasonably reliable because they are offi cial tax records and are subject 
to some audit controls. They are not perfect, however, for a number of 
reasons, including uncovered employment, failure to report by employ-
ers, and errors in reporting that prevent matches of wages to participant 
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records, but they do supply the vast majority of the data needed to 
measure outcomes. The ETA must continue to allow states to collect 
“supplemental” earnings data collected directly from program custom-
ers to compensate for the gaps in wage record data. This is particularly 
important, because the need for supplemental data varies widely by re-
gion. Wage record data are signifi cantly less complete in agricultural 
areas; areas with a larger “underground economy” (such as Hawaii and 
Puerto Rico, where employment in tourist-related industries is more 
informal); and in areas with a high concentration of contract labor, 
such as the movie and software industries. Another critical issue is pro-
viding states with access to wage data collected by other states. Until 
recently, the ETA had experienced mixed success in establishing such 
a system, but privacy and legal concerns have rendered interstate wage 
data useless for performance management purposes. States can send 
fi les of Social Security numbers and receive aggregate rates of matches 
with a national wage fi le (including federal and military employment) 
to obtain more accurate entered employment, retention, and earnings 
data; however, this data is not provided at the customer level and is 
useless for analyzing and improving performance. Many states have 
had bilateral wage-record-sharing agreements since WIA began and can 
continue to use these more detailed data to analyze their performance 
at the customer level. 
Not all employment and training programs can access the state 
wage record fi le; this is either because some are nongovernmental enti-
ties or because it is too cumbersome to negotiate access with the UI 
agency. SCSEP, for example, still conducts manual follow-up with each 
exiter up to three times to obtain postexit earnings data, which must be 
carefully documented for data validation. This additional burden can 
be seen as adding value because it allows grantees to provide follow-
up employment support services. The Pathways to Work project in the 
United Kingdom planned to conduct extensive provider follow-up be-
cause there were no available earnings data equivalent to the UI data in 
the United States. 
One of the major problems with reliance on wage data for per-
formance management is that the fi les are not complete and available 
until about six to nine months after entry into the employment activity 
being measured. This prevents timely feedback to program operators, 
but it is still a far more cost-effective approach than expensive and un-
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reliable informal follow-up data as gathered under JTPA. The six- to 
nine-month lag in the availability of complete employment outcome 
data is an unfortunate reality and does limit the benefi ts of the analytical 
feedback loop to program operators, which is a key aspect of an effec-
tive performance management system. 
Although outcome data are the primary source for performance 
management, additional data are helpful for some programs where cus-
tomers receive services over a long period of time. This is especially 
an issue in the WIA younger youth program where customers may be 
enrolled for fi ve years or more and to some degree in SCSEP and VR as 
well. These programs would benefi t from intermediary progress mea-
sures to provide more timely feedback to program operators on their 
performance. The literacy and numeracy gain measure in the WIA 
Youth program is an ideal measure not only because it is well-defi ned 
but also because it provides continuous feedback on youth progress to 
program operators. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced some of the challenges of effective per-
formance management. We can conclude that top priority should be 
placed on establishing a solid foundation of collecting and processing 
data consistently and accurately to help Congress, program managers, 
and local One-Stop administrators to understand who is being served 
and what their outcomes are. There are many technical aspects to de-
veloping this foundation, and this chapter has only touched on them. An 
effective performance management system requires enlightened federal 
leadership with a sound understanding of the potential and limitations 
of performance system and a commitment to effective performance 
management. Federal staff must take the lead in promoting the value of 
performance management to the other levels of the system and fi rmly 
enforce performance objectives. 
Only when the foundation for effective performance management 
is securely in place should policymakers take punitive action on the 
fi ndings. They should concentrate initially on identifying superior and 
inferior performers, analyzing which processes and methods produce 
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the best results, and providing technical assistance to the poor perform-
ers. The least emphasis should be on rewards and sanctions. These 
motivational devices can be useful but are often rushed into play before 
the data are reliable or well understood and thus engender resistance 
to performance management and inappropriate behavior by program 
operators. 
Notes
1. The Performance Management Group at Mathematica Policy Research has been 
involved in designing and implementing performance management and data 
validation systems for WIA, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act, the Labor 
Exchange (or the ES), the National Farmworker Jobs Program, the Senior Com-
munity Service Employment Program, the Unemployment Insurance Program, 
and the Vocational Rehabilitation Program. The group also works on TANF and 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) performance reporting and 
on assessing performance for Medicaid and Education Department grants. 
2. Congress always restored NFJP funding. 
3. WIA requires the local boards to contract the operation of the One-Stop centers, 
although public entities often hold the contracts. 
4. Counts are sometimes used as performance measures, for example, if there is no 
real process to measure, such as program outcomes after a spell of services, or 
if the designer of the measures just wants to demonstrate results by adding up 
events that are considered to have social value. In these situations, the counts are 
not really performance measures in a technical sense and should not be confused 
with actual performance data. Such counts can be converted to rates if they refl ect 
underlying performance and not increases in funding. 
5. The data reporting and validation software calculates over 1,600 individual cells 
on various WIA and ES reports, as well as tens of thousands of additional cal-
culations needed for other reporting, validation, and analytical functions. These 
calculations, reports, and functionality are documented in more than 500 pages 
of specifi cations and high-level requirements. The software also applies roughly 
300 edit checks to the data. Extensive testing is done to ensure that the calculated 
results are correct for every state regardless of numerous variations in data fi les 
submitted by the states.
6. The feedback was immediate when states loaded their customer fi les (e.g., the 
WIASRD) into the software, but was still constrained by data lags associated with 
wage records.
7. Many states have invested in performance software and use the federal validation 
software for testing and to validate their performance reports. Even if the state cal-
culations are determined to be incorrect by the data validation software, the ETA 
uses data from the state calculations and not the validated calculations in its report 
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to Congress. Approximately 20 –25 states use the federal software to generate their 
performance reports. Given budget cuts and the focus on other priorities, the ETA 
reduced the funding for the maintenance of the reporting and data validation soft-
ware for WIA and ES. The functionality for states has diminished since 2005, and 
many of the suggestions states made for enhancing the software have not been im-
plemented. The Offi ce of Inspector General (2009) concluded that “with the lack 
of software upgrades, the effectiveness and effi ciency of using the data validation 
software as a tool to improve the accuracy and reliability of WIA performance data 
has been compromised” (pp. 3, 11). 
8. The UI data validation program does have data accuracy standards and computes 
reliable estimates of error, taking sampling error into account.
9. The National Association of State Workforce Agencies represents the state 
agencies that administer WIA and most related programs. The VR program is rep-
resented by the Council of State Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation. 
10. SCSEP, ES, NFJP, and the Division of Indian and Native American Programs all 
convened performance workgroups in 2000 and 2001.
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